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ABSTRACT 
Many consider salvage value and tourism expenditures as the only economic values of a 
historic shipwreck. This paper looks at one alternative, the non-market value generated by 
management of shipwrecks as submerged maritime cultural resources. We consider the 
question: How much are people willing to pay to maintain shipwrecks in their pristine state? The 
contingent valuation method was implemented during summer 2001 as part of a telephone 
survey to households in eastern North Carolina. We find that households are willing to pay 
about $35 in a one-time increase in state taxes. Willingness to pay is internally validated by 
expected relationships with prices and income but fails to pass the scope test. We speculate 
that we inadvertently succumbed to the well-known "birds" problem. The double-bounded 
willingness to pay questions are not incentive compatible and are subject to starting point bias, 
despite efforts to minimize these effects. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Submerged maritime cultural resources (i.e., historic shipwrecks) can be valuable 
archaeological sites with information that helps to understand past societies and the 
development of maritime activities throughout the world. In contrast, the market 
value of a historic shipwreck is the price of the artifacts salvaged from a shipwreck 
as determined through auction or direct sale. Contemporary salvors (i.e., treasure 
hunters) find profit by salvaging abandoned ships or ships in distress, a practice 
rooted in ancient law. 
 
Another market value related to historic shipwrecks is the expenditures made by 
visitors to maritime museums, historic ship replicas, and decommissioned ships. 
The creation of museums and exhibits protects historic shipwrecks but they still 
entail the removal of the wreck and its contents from underwater. Such a venture 
is not economically viable for all wrecks. The cost of excavation and conservation 
of shipwrecks is high. Most archaeologists, historians, and even the general public 
would not want all shipwrecks disturbed in this manner. Ships considered tombs 
to those who died there, ships with historical significance, and ships too fragile to 
safely excavate could be maintained as underwater preserves. 
 
In contrast to salvage value and tourism expenditures, the non-market value of 
shipwrecks includes the use and non-use value of historic shipwrecks. Use value 
includes the benefits to recreational divers who enjoy historic shipwrecks as destinations. 
Non-use value includes the benefits to people who enjoy knowing about 
historic shipwrecks without on-site use. Non-users of shipwrecks might include 
tourists who gain knowledge by visiting coastal areas, waterfronts, maritime museums 
and ship memorials. Such knowledge can also be obtained through reading 
and watching television programs. 
 
Nevertheless, salvage is the only economic value typically considered when 
investigating the value of shipwrecks. In this context, Kaoru and Hoagland (1994) 
suggest that application of the contingent valuation method is the preferred 
methodology to obtain estimates of the value of shipwreck protection in order to 
balance the competing demands of shipwrecks. In one related application, Vrana 
and Halsey (1992) estimate use value by asking respondents about willingness to 
pay for permits to dive in a hypothetical Great Lakes park that includes historic 
shipwrecks. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether there are potentially significant 
non-market values for managing historic shipwrecks as submerged maritime 
cultural resources rather than as salvageable market commodities. We use the 
contingent valuation method to estimate this value and consider the methodological 
issues of scope and incentive incompatibility with double-bounded valuation 
questions. 
 
Scope insensitivity exists if willingness to pay estimates for a public good 
and a public good of greater quality or quantity are not significantly different. 
Critics of the contingent valuation method argue that scope insensitivity renders 
the contingent valuation method invalid for policy analysis (e.g., Diamond and 
Hausman, 1994). Others argue that findings of sensitivity to scope are common 
(e.g., Hanemann, 1994) and that the scope test is not a critical test of the validity 
of the contingent valuation method (Randall, 1998). Navrud and Ready (2002) find 
that no contingent valuation of culture study to date has tested for scope effects. 
In this paper we provide the first application that considers whether willingness to 
pay for cultural resources is sensitive to scope. 
 
Double-bounded willingness to pay questions are prone to incentive incompatibility 
(Alberini et al., 1997). For example, respondents who vote for a proposal 
at a fixed tax amount may perceive that government is wasting money when they 
are confronted with the same proposal priced at a higher tax amount. Respondents 
who vote against the project may perceive that the project will be of lower quality 
when confronted with a lower tax amount. In both cases there are incentives to vote 
against the project in the second question, regardless of true willingness to pay, and 
the second willingness to pay amount may shift downward. We adopt a suggestion 
made by Alberini et al. (1997) in an attempt to minimize incentive incompatibility. 
 
In the next section we provide a description of the survey and the responses. 
Next we describe the willingness to pay models. Then we present the empirical 
results. Finally, we offer some conclusions. 
 
 
2. THE SURVEY 
 
In order to measure the non-market value of historic shipwrecks we designed 
contingent valuation questions as part of an omnibus telephone survey of eastern 
North Carolina residents conducted during the summer of 2001. The response rate 
of 46% is measured as the number of completed surveys divided by the sum of 
completions and refusals. The number of completed surveys is 913. Eight hundred 
eighty-four cases are useable for the analysis. This sample includes two-hundred 
forty cases with household income values imputed from a regression model. 1 The 
sample average household income is $37,210. Sixty-nine percent of the sample is 
white and 37% is male. Sixty-one percent of the sample is married. The average 
household size is 2.44. Average education is 13.39 years and the average age is 
almost 50 years.2 
 
Several questions specific to historic shipwrecks were presented to survey 
respondents.3 The purpose of these questions is to estimate the willingness to pay 
for a historic shipwreck state park with protection from treasure hunters in North 
Carolina. The first two questions are about knowledge of shipwrecks and begin 
with some background information. Respondents are given a definition of historic 
shipwrecks and told that "over 5,000 ships have been lost off the North Carolina 
coast earning the state the nickname: the graveyard of the Atlantic". We then ask 
respondents how much they know about historic shipwrecks. 
 
Respondents are told that the state Historic Preservation Office monitors over 
5,000 shipwrecks and the state underwater archaeology unit has studied about 900 
of these wrecks. The policy problem is then described. Respondents are told that 
the state cannot adequately protect a shipwreck from treasure hunters. Respondents 
are asked to suppose that North Carolina was considering a historic shipwreck 
state park that would protect the most important shipwrecks from treasure hunters. 
Access to the park would be monitored and controlled and information about the 
park would be distributed to the public. 
Then the willingness to pay questions are presented. Respondents are told that 
creation of the park would require additional state money to protect the most 
important shipwrecks. Respondents are given "one estimate" of the cost as a onetime 
increase in state taxes and then asked to suppose that the creation of the park 
was put to a vote in the next statewide election. The willingness to pay questions 
are presented as a state-wide referendum (i.e., "would you vote for or against the 
park?"). 
There are eight versions of the willingness to pay questions. The first, singlebound 
question has two versions for the park size (50 or 100 protected shipwrecks) 
and four price versions ($10, $30, $60, $90).4 Double-bounded questions present 
a follow-up. If the referendum vote is "for" on the first willingness to pay question, 
the next presents a variation in the proposal in which the size of the park is 
increased by 2.5 and the price is doubled. If the referendum vote is "against" or 
"don't know" on the first question the size of the park is divided by 1.25 and the 
price of the park is halved in the follow-up question. 
 
For those respondents who received the 50 shipwreck park version, 67%,51 %, 
34%, and 40% voted for the park at taxes of $10, $30, $60, and $90. The differences 
are statistically significant at the p = 0.01 level (X 2 = 27.29 [3 dfj). For those 
respondents who received the 100 shipwreck park version, 58%, 49%, 36%, and 
43% voted for the park at taxes of $10, $30, $60, and $90. The differences are 
statistically significant at the p = 0.01 level (X 2 = 12.34 [3 dfj). Overall, 47% and 
46% voted for the 50 and 100 shipwreck parks. The differences across the size of 
the park are not statistically significant. 
 
The double-bounded responses indicate that most were reluctant to change their 
answers when the park size and tax amount changed (Table I). Twenty-nine percent 
and 46% of respondents in each park size version voted for and against on each 
question, respectively. Less than 20% voted for on the first question and against on 
the second. Less than 10% voted against on the first question and for on the second. 
 
 
3. WILLINGNESS TO PAY MODELS 
 
Both single-bound and double-bounded willingness to pay models are estimated. 
With the single-bound data the probit model is used to empirically determine the 
factors that affect the for and against votes in the first referendum. With the doublebounded 
data the random effects probit model for panel data is used (Alberini 
et al., 1997; Greene, 2000). The willingness to pay models are derived from the 
probit coefficients using the procedures described in Cameron and James (1987). 
The standard errors for the coefficients and the willingness to pay estimates are 
constructed using the Delta Method (Cameron, 1991; Greene, 2000, p. 278). The 
LIMDEP econometric software is used (Greene, 1997). 
 
Two models for the single-bound and double-bounded data are estimated. The 
first model includes only economic variables that might affect willingness to pay 
including the one-time tax amount, the size of the park (Quantity), on-site use 
prices (Travel Cost 1 and Travel Cost 2), and income. The second model includes 
demographic variables. 
 
 
 
By incorporating different sizes of the park into the experimental design we 
conduct the scope test. Since willingness to pay should be non-decreasing in scope 
the expected sign of the Quantity variable is positive or zero (Whitehead et al., 
1998). In response to a suggestion made by Alberini et al. (1997) we vary the 
quantity of the good (i.e., size of the park) between the first and second referendum 
in an attempt to minimize incentive incompatibility. The goal is to (l) convince 
those that are being asked to pay more that they will receive a larger good in return 
and (2) convince those that are being asked to pay less that they are receiving a 
good of equal quality. 
 
The on-site use price variables measure the potential own-price and cross-price 
effects of the park as a travel destination (Whitehead et al., 1994).5 The Travel 
Cost 1 variable measures the travel and time costs of a trip from the population 
center of the respondent's county to the Outer Banks of North Carolina (i.e., "the 
graveyard of the Atlantic"). The town of Manteo is considered as the gateway to 
the Outer Banks for most visitors and is used in the distance calculation. The Travel 
Cost 2 variable measures the travel and time costs of a trip to Morehead City, near 
the location of the remains of the pirate Blackbeard's flagship, the Queen Anne's 
Revenge. The mean travel costs to Manteo and Morehead City are $130 and $103. 
We control for both incentive compatibility and starting point bias with two additional 
independent variables in both double-bounded models (Whitehead, 2002). 
 
In the random effects probit we include a dummy variable equal to one for the 
second willingness to pay question and zero otherwise (Shift) and the Shift variable 
interacted with the tax amount from the first question (Anchor). When the probit 
results are converted to the willingness to pay model the Shift effect measures the 
difference in willingness to pay between the first and second questions. The An- 
char effect measures the weight attached to the tax amount in the first referendum 
question. In other words, it is a test for starting point bias (Herriges and Shogren, 
1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The results of the willingness to pay models are presented in Table II. The vector 
of coefficients in each model is statistically different from zero according to the 
likelihood ratio test (i.e., X2 = -2[Beginning LL - Ending LL]). In the double-bounded 
models the p parameter is the contribution of the total variance in the error 
term due to the error term common to the respondent (i.e., the random effects). 
The p parameter indicates that almost all of the variation is at the individual level 
and not random error. This result indicates that the random effects specification is 
appropriate. 
The scale parameter, (), is the negative inverse of the probit coefficient of the 
tax amount. In each model the scale parameter is positive and statistically different 
from zero indicating that as the tax amount increases respondents are less likely 
to vote for the project. Respondents are behaving rationally in the referendum. 
Another consistent result in across the models is the lack of a scope effect. Respondents 
do not perceive the park with 100 shipwrecks to be more valuable than 
the park with 50 shipwrecks. 
 
In each model, the coefficient of Travel Cost I is negative and statistically significant. 
In the double-bounded models the coefficient of Travel Cost 2 is positive 
and statistically significant. These results suggest that respondents perceive the 
coastal area near the Outer Banks to be the location of the proposed park and the 
coastal area near Morehead City to be a substitute location for on-site activities related 
to the park. The absolute value of the own-price coefficient can be interpreted 
as the increased number of recreation trips that would be taken with establishment 
of the park (Huang et aI., 1997). Across the models, the range of increased trips 
is 0.16 to 0.20 for each respondent. In other words, between 16% and 20% of the 
respondents would take one additional trip to the Outer Banks with establishment 
of the park. A significant portion of willingness to pay is use value. 
 
In the models without demographic variables the coefficient of Income is positive 
and statistically significant. This result reveals that the shipwreck park is a 
normal good. The income elasticity of willingness to pay is 1.21 in the single-bound 
model and 1.10 in the double-bounded model. The income elasticity is high 
relative to most contingent valuation applications. This indicates that willingness 
to pay is very sensitive to income. When demographic variables are added to the 
models the income coefficients are no longer significantly different from zero. This 
is not surprising since income is correlated with each of the demographic variables. 
 
In the single-bound model willingness to pay is $26 lower for married respondents, 
$12 higher for each additional household member, and $12 higher for each 
additional year of education. In the double-bounded model, willingness to pay 
is $29 lower for married respondents, $14 higher for each additional household 
member, and $11 higher for each additional year of education. Race, gender, and 
age do not have statistically significant effects on willingness to pay. The vector 
of demographic coefficients is statistically significant according to the likelihood 
ratio statistic for the single-bound (X 2 = 37.22 [6 df]) and double-bounded models 
(X 2 = 37.34 [6 df]). 
 
The willingness to pay estimates from the first referendum question are between 
$38 and $39 in the single-bound models and between $33 and $34 in the 
double-bounded models. The differences in the single-bound and double-bounded 
willingness to pay estimates are not statistically different. In the double-bounded 
models the shift effect is statistically significant and greater in absolute value than 
the willingness to pay estimates. This indicates that the incentive incompatibility 
is so extreme that the willingness to pay estimates implied from the second referendum 
are negative (in the linear model). The anchoring effect indicates that the 
willingness to pay implied from the second referendum question is a function of 
the starting tax amount. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide an estimate of the willingness to pay 
for management of submerged maritime cultural resources. The empirical results 
indicate that respondents are willing to pay money for protection of shipwrecks 
from treasure hunters and preserving the public good aspects of these cultural 
resources. The willingness to pay models are sensible and conform to economic 
theory. This indicates that the willingness to pay estimates have some degree of 
validity and are useful for policy analysis. 
 
We find that willingness to pay is insensitive to the scope of the policy. This result, 
by itself, does not invalidate the willingness to pay estimates since willingness 
to pay should be nondecreasing in scope. However, it is troubling since an increase 
in willingness to pay after a doubling of the size of the park is intuitively appealing. 
On closer inspection of the contingent valuation scenario we may have unwittingly 
succumbed to the "birds" problem. Boyle et al. (1994) find that willingness to pay 
does not vary for a program to avoid the deaths of "much less than 1 %", "less than 
1 %", and "about 2%" of the migratory waterfowl population in the central flyway. 
Hanemann (1994) argues that it is not surprising that willingness to pay does not 
differ across these programs because respondents may not perceive any difference 
in the number of birds when placed in percentage terms. In our survey, the park 
size varies from 50 to 100 of the 5,000 shipwrecks that the state of North Carolina 
monitors. It should not be surprising that willingness to pay does not vary when 
shipwreck protection varies from 1 % to 2% of the total. 
 
Our experimental design also includes a previously untested attempt to solve 
the incentive incompatibility problem of double-bounded willingness to pay questions. 
Nevertheless, we find that the follow-up responses suffer from incentive 
incompatibility as measured by a large shift in willingness to pay from the first 
to the second question. In addition, the follow-up willingness to pay responses 
suffer from starting point bias. These results may be due to the "birds" problem 
described above. If respondents did not consider the change in the scope of the 
park to be significant, then an insignificant change in scope should not affect the 
incentive incompatibility of the follow-up willingness to pay question. 
 
An understanding of the economic value of historic shipwreck management 
is useful in helping to determine how many resources should be devoted toward 
protecting historic shipwrecks from treasure hunters and other consumptive users. 
According to the 2000 Census there are about 850,000 households in the sample 
region. Using the most conservative willingness to pay estimate from Table II the 
aggregate willingness to pay is $27.90 million (2001 U.S. dollars). A 30-year annuity 
yielding 5% would generate $1.73 million in annual revenue for managing 
the park. If the annual cost of managing the park is less than $1.73 million, estab- 
lishment of the park represents an improvement in economic efficiency. Aggregate 
benefit estimates are biased downward by the extent to which residents of the rest 
of North Carolina and other states value historic shipwreck protection in North 
Carolina. 
 
Our results suggest a number of topics for future cultural valuation research. 
Inclusion of contingent behavior questions would be one way of validating the 
willingness to pay estimates for cultural resources. Joint estimation of trip data 
and willingness to pay data could be used to calibrate the willingness to pay data 
and differentiate between use and non-use values (Huang et aI., 1997). Second, 
future contingent valuation of culture research should investigate scope effects. 
Researchers should vary the quantity or quality of the cultural resource by more 
than 1 % or 2% of the total. Finally, researchers should continue to investigate 
the incentive compatibility of follow-up questions in order to exploit the potential 
gains in efficiency from bounded willingness to pay without biasing willingness 
to pay estimates. Any variations in the wording or context of the follow-up questions 
that avoids misperceptions about the intentions of the questions would be an 
improvement. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. See Appendix A at the primary author's website for a discussion of the data imputation 
procedure. 
2. See Appendix B at the primary author's website for a comparison of sample demographics to 
the population demographics. 
3. See Appendix C at the primary author's website for the survey questions and raw data 
frequencies. 
4. A pretest of these tax amounts was not feasible due to a limited research budget. 
5. See Appendix D at the primary author's website for details about the travel cost variables. 
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